WHAT CAN BE SHOWN CANNOT BE SAID
WITTGENSTEIN'S DOCTRINE OF SHOWING AND BORGES' "THE ALEPH"

Shlomy Mualem

The Bible describes how God speaks to the people of Israel and reveals to them the Ten Commandments (*Exodus* 20: 1-14). A Hassidic rabbi, Menahem Mendel Merimanov, adds a genuine commentary to the event: in his view, all the divine voice pronounced was the first letter of the first word of the first command (in Hebrew: 'anochi') – the infinite Aleph. The rest was Moses' human interpretation (Scholem 34). This view is based on a cabalistic tradition that perceives the Aleph, the first word of the Hebrew alphabet, as the spiritual resource of all the letters, the preliminary condition of speech. The cabalistic Aleph does not convey any concrete meaning since it comprises infinity. Thus it cannot be pronounced by humans and its utterance was the real divine revelation on mount Sinai (Scholem 35). This stance presupposes a decisive dichotomy within language, a dichotomy between 1) an ineffable transcendental dimension which is represented by the Aleph, and 2) a conventional dimension of human communication. Language, then, comprises an internal split since its human dimension cannot pronounce its transcendental one. The Aleph cannot be expressed and yet it shows itself in language.

In accordance with this viewpoint, the following essay will interpret Borges' story "The Aleph" as a text whose central philosophical problem is a rupture within language, a rupture that prevents any attempt to say what the spectacle of the Aleph shows. This interpretation will be preceded by, and based upon, a thorough analysis of Wittgenstein's doctrine of showing presented in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Hence, the first part of the essay will examine Wittgenstein's showing doctrine using the notion of 'logical space', and the second part will establish a wittgensteinian interpretation of "The Aleph".

1. WITTGENSTEIN'S DOCTRINE OF SHOWING

1.1. SHOWING AND SAYING

In a famous letter to Russell, dated 19.8.18, that deals with the meaning of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein declares that

> The main point is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions – i.e. by language – (and, which comes to the same, what can be *thought*) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy. (*Letters* 71).

These words coincide Wittgenstein's statement in his introduction to the *Tractatus*:

> The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. (3).

Wittgenstein's delimitation of what can be said, which makes the *Tractatus* a sort of a "criticism of pure language" (Stenius 220), is carried out by the doctrine of showing. An elucidation of this doctrine should be preceded by a short outline of the *Tractatus'* ontology. In brief, the 'world' in the *Tractatus* is the sum of atomic facts: "The facts in logical space are the world" (1.13). A meaningful proposition is a logical picture, true or false, of a possible fact (4.01). Language, then, is based on logical form, or logic, 'the great mirror'

of the world (5.511). Wittgenstein insists that every proposition must necessarily be bipolar: it divides the whole range of logical space into what is inside the realm of a possible fact [P], and what is outside of it [~P] (4.0641), in the same way that any island divides the whole globe (Anscombe 75). Yet, there are things, essential things, that necessarily cannot be expressed by any proposition; they can only be shown in language:

> Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it – logical form. In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.
>
> Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by means of language. Propositions *show* the logical form of reality. They display it. (*Tractatus* 4.12 – 4.121)

What is the meaning of this distinction between what can be said (or expressed, or represented) and what can be shown (or mirrored or express itself)? Actually, there is an ongoing dispute among Wittgenstein's commentators regarding this issue. Black, in his thorough companion to the *Tractatus*, observes the notion of 'showing' as a crucial concept which unfortunately "is most elusive" (190). What is clear, according to Black, is that Wittgenstein presents a sharp antithesis between 'showing' and 'saying' or 'asserting' although "It is more troublesome to decide whether Wittgenstein was justified in drawing so sharp a line…" (194). Russell, in his famous introduction to the *Tractatus*, takes what shows itself to be the mystical (*Tractatus* xxi). Moreover, Pears adds a kantian interpretation to the *Tractatus*. In his view the showing doctrine contains the implicit metaphysical dimension of the book (*Wittgenstein* 48); Whereas Kant claims that there are substantial necessary truths, Wittgenstein suggests that there are things that can only be shown but not said (Pears *Wittgenstein* 88). In a more analytical approach, Stenius explains the saying-showing dichotomy as a logical distinction between internal and ex-

ternal features, following *Tractatus* 4.122 (Stenius 179). Brockhaus, on the other hand, perceives this dichotomy as the split between the active and the passive elements of language (184).

It seems that the difficulty to understand the doctrine of showing stems from the fact that, although highly significant, it is only dimly defined in the *Tractatus*. In the words of Pears "It is a baffling doctrine bafflingly presented" (*Prison* 143). Another problem is that there are actually two types of 'showing' in the *Tractatus*: the logical-linguistic showing (4.12 – 4.1212) and the ethical-aesthetical showing (6.421). Some commentators suggest that these two kinds of showing are intimately interrelated (Nieli 116, Engelmann 111). Others claim that there are two essentially different types of showing, the one is immanent and the other transcendent (Pears *Prison* 146, Hudson 111-112).

Furthermore, it is eventually not clear why what can be shown cannot be said, somehow. After all, Wittgenstein himself says something about showing in prohibiting its pronouncement. This is perhaps Russell's most acute criticism of the *Tractatus*. "Mr. Wittgenstein", says Russell rather sarcastically,

> manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the skeptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit (*Tractatus* xxi).

Consequently Russell suggests an alternative doctrine which coincides his 'theory of logical types'. He offers a hierarchical system of languages in which each language says the logical structure that is shown by the former language (xxii). Wittgenstein sharply opposes this viewpoint and provides three justifications for his doctrine of ineffable showing: 1) saying what shows itself in language is redundant, or tautologous, since it only duplicates the same declaration (*Notebooks* 109); 2) the attempt to say what can only be shown is not a bipolar proposition and therefore it is nonsense (*Tractatus* 6.53); 3) No language can express logical form since every possible language is necessarily based upon it. In order to say logical form without containing it, language must step outside logic - i.e. outside the world (*Tractatus* 4.12).

According to early Wittgenstein, then, language is based on a paradox: it comprises ineffable features that it cannot possibly express. During his conversation with (or rather, notes dictated to) Moore, Wittgenstein puts it as follows:

> In order that you should have a language which can express or *say* everything that *can* be said, this language must have certain properties; and when this is the case, *that* it has them can no longer be said in that language or *any* language (*Notebooks* 107).

In accordance with this paradox the famous concluding sentence of the *Tractatus*, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence", can be conceived as an expression of the decisive saying-showing dichotomy. There are things we should not say; they show themselves (*Tractatus* 6.522). Moreover the *Tractatus,* according to its own criteria of meaning, is a nonsensical text which tries to express the ineffable nature of language, as Wittgenstein admits in 6.54. Wittgenstein was, then, perfectly aware of this tension-within-language displayed in his system. He expresses this tension in an often-quoted letter to Engelmann:

> And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then *nothing* gets lost. But the unutterable will be – unutterably – *contained* in what has been uttered! (Engelmann 7).

Indeed, it seems that showing and saying are not a mere antithesis. They maintain an inner interdependence although they constitute a dichotomy. On the one hand, the act of saying, if done correctly according to the criteria of what can be said, leaves space for showing to manifest itself; on the other, showing is the background against which saying becomes meaningful. Thus in *Culture and Value* Wittgenstein remarks:

> Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I can express has its meaning. (*Culture* 16e).

What is clear is that in the *Tractatus* language is a twofaced system. During a conversation with the Vienna Circle, recorded by

Waismann in 22.12.1929, Wittgenstein affirms this twofold nature of language of his early thought:

> I used to believe that there was the everyday language that we all usually spoke *and* a primary language that expressed what we really knew, namely phenomena. I also spoke of a first system and a second system. (Waismann 45)

In conclusion, the 'baffling' showing doctrine entails the following characteristics:

—Language comprises a sharp dichotomy between what can be said and what can only be shown. Language thus contains a dialectical tension between the expressible and the ineffable.

—Saying and showing are not a mere antithesis; they are interdependent.

1.2. SHOWING AND 'LOGICAL SPACE'

And yet, what is 'showing'? The main question seems to be left without a satisfactory answer. In order to probe the issue, I will try at this point to clarify the showing doctrine using the notion of 'logical space'. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not unequivocally define 'logical space' in the *Tractatus* (Glock 220) but rather declares that "The facts in logical space are the world" (*Tractatus* 1.13). Seemingly he means that 'logical space' indicates the ensemble of all possible combinations of facts, which is the world, and thus the term 'logical space' becomes tantamount to the term 'world'. In the same manner Stenius perceives 'logical space' as the summation of all possible worlds, each of them represents one possible combination of facts (52-54). Accordingly Black explains the notion as the totality of all logical places, the ordered system of all atomic situations (155). In addition, Glock remarks that this term originates in Boltzmann's thermodynamics "which treats the independent properties of a physical system as defining separate coordinates in a multidimensional system the points of which constitute the 'ensemble of possible states'" (220) – an important, yet unestablished, remark.

It is obvious, then, that the notion of 'logical space' is dominant in the system of the *Tractatus*. As Wittgenstein remarks in his essay "Notes on Logic", every genuine proposition is essentially bipolar: it is a logical point that divides the whole realm of logical space (*Notebooks* 94). Thus logical space is the background against which every proposition is being defined, in the same manner that geometrical space is the necessary background of any geometrical figure (*Tractatus* 3.411). Thereafter he adds a rather enigmatic remark on the connection between a particular proposition and logical space:

> A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it. (Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc., would introduce more and more new elements – in coordination.) (The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space.) (3.42).

A proposition, thus, is a paradoxical phenomenon. Although it determines one and only one logical point within logical space, it somehow manages to convey the whole field of logical space. One confined logical place entails the whole *infinite* logical space (*Tractatus* 4.463). It is, so to speak, one point that entraps the total range of all other possible points. Enigmatically, the particular entails generality. Anscombe tries to clarify this paradox using a metaphor of an island:

> If you consider an island marked on the surface of a sphere, it is clear that it defines not merely its own shape but the shape of the rest of the surface. A proposition is to be compared to such an island, its negation to the rest of the surface (75).

Each and every proposition, then, shapes the whole range of logical space, and thus the whole range of language, whose borders are the borders of logic (*Tractatus* 5.6, 5.61). Wittgenstein declares this feature in a letter to Russell dated 30.10.1913: "One of the consequences of my new ideas will – I think – be that the whole of Logic follows from one proposition only!!" (*Letters* 32). And yet, logic, according to *Tractatus* 6.13, is the mirror-image of the world. Hence, every proposition of language expresses one possible fact in the

world while in the same time it mirrors the whole range of the world.

Now what is the actual linguistic expression of this disposition? The answer can be provided via the doctrine of showing: a proposition *says* one fact in the world while it simultaneously *shows* the whole range of the world. To put it in other words, a proposition explicitly expresses one confined logical place whereas it implicitly shows the whole of logical space – the whole range of reality (*Tractatus* 2.06) or the world as a limited-whole. Hence a proposition is a logical point representing all other logical points; the total world is mingled within every proposition of language.

A support to this rather mystical viewpoint can be found in Wittgenstein's *Notebooks* whereat he elaborates his forthcoming system of the *Tractatus*. Dealing with the work of art as an object seen from the viewpoint of eternity (*sub specie aeternitatis*), Wittgenstein remarks as follows:

> Is this it perhaps - in this view the object is seen *together with* space and time instead *in* space and time? …each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak…The thing seen sub specie aeterni is the thing seen together with the whole logical space (*Notebooks* 83e).

In this statement we can clearly see an interface between the particular and generality on the one hand, and a synonymy of the phrases 'logical world' and 'logical space' on the other. A proposition, entrapping the whole of logical space, as mentioned in *Tractatus* 3.42, coincides the object seen "together with space and time instead in space and time". In this manner they both represent the whole world: "As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally significant" (*Notebooks* 83e).

To sum up Wittgenstein's showing doctrine, it seems that language entails a decisive dichotomy between 1) what can be said, a manifestation of one possible fact in a bipolar proposition, and 2) what shows itself but cannot be expressed, i.e. logical form or logical space or the mingled total world. Every proposition contains a tension between particular expression and ineffable totality. In other words, every proposition entails a *digression* from what it states: it

says a fact in the world and in the same time it *shows* logical space, the total range of the world. We will turn now to observe Borges' story "The Aleph" from this viewpoint.

2. "THE ALEPH" AND WITTGENSTEIN'S DOCTRINE OF SHOWING

The Aleph is one of Borges' most celebrated stories. I will try to show hereby that its philosophical crux is a rupture within language that accords Wittgenstein's showing-saying dichotomy. The expression of this rupture is the inability of Borges to depict the Aleph, which represents the transcendental dimension of language, by means of conventional speech. Yet, the analysis ought to be preceded by a short outline of the plot.

The plot begins with the death of Beatriz Viterbo, the late valentine of Borges. Thereafter Borges decides to dedicate himself to her memory and thus he maintains his social relations with her family. During his annual meetings with Beatriz's family Borges meets her cousin Carlos Argentino Daneri who turns out to be a poet, or rather a grotesque caricature of a poet. Daneri strives at the overweening task of writing a poem which will depict the entire world. One day Daneri calls Borges and complains that Zunino and Zungry, his landlords, plan to destroy his house and that that is an outrage since he keeps the Aleph in his basement. He describes the Aleph as "el lugar donde están, sin confundirse, todos los lugares del orbe, vistos desde todos los ángulos" (*OC* 1: 623). Borges arrives at Daneri's basement and foresees the marvelous spectacle of the Aleph, which reflects the entire universe simultaneously. The following futile attempt to depict the vision of the Aleph is, as Borges declares, the crux of the plot: "Arribo, ahora, al inefable centro de mi relato; empieza, aquí, mi desesperación de escritor (…) ¿cómo trasmitir a los otros el infinito Aleph, que mi temerosa memoria apenas abarca?"(624).

We will turn now to the analysis of the plot. The spectacle of the Aleph can be observed as a pure mystical experience; Borges himself relates his vision to the mystics Attar, Alanus of Insulis and Ezequiel (625). Yet, the spectacle of the Aleph straightforwardly entails linguistic attributes:

1) it belongs to a pathetic poet who strives at an extensive literal representation of the world;

2) its name, 'Aleph', is the first Hebrew letter which, according to the cabalists, represents infinitude;

3) it is seen by a narrator, Borges, who later struggles with the limits of language while trying to depict his experience by words;

4) Daneri has discovered the Aleph due to a linguistic misunderstanding: he literally understood that there was 'a world' in the basement while his uncles used this phrase as a metaphor of a suitcase.

The philosophical center of the story is thus language itself or, as Rest asserts (153), the limits of language. Accordingly, Alazraki suggests that the main problem of the text is the mimetic relation between the word and the world - the failure of language to represent reality adequately (298-299). Likewise, Massuh claims that the heart of the text is not the Aleph in itself but the impossibility to depict the Aleph, which is again the problem of the limits of language (113). The same borgesian stance of language as a limited medium can be traced in Barrenechea (79-82) and Jaén (137-152).

In addition to these linguistic observations of "The Aleph", I will suggest hereby a wittgensteinian commentary. In the light of Wittgenstein' doctrine of showing, the philosophical crux of the text can be seen as a rupture within language: a dichotomy between the transcendental dimension, the Aleph, which can only be shown and seen, and the conventional dimension of communication. In this viewpoint, the vision of the Aleph represents an internal dimension of language, and Borges' abortion to depict the Aleph by means of words represents the limits of the other dimension. More specifically, the inability of the responsible narrator to depict the Aleph stands for the impotence of language to express its own mingled transcendental essence. Accordingly, Wittgenstein manifests in the *Tractatus* a linguistic division between what can be said and what can only be shown, the logical form which is transcendental (6.13). An important corollary of this viewpoint is that language entails an enigmatic digression: Language shows much more than its users in-

tend to say. Every proposition tacitly presents much more than it actually displays: it says a fact in the world while simultaneously presenting the entire reality. This orientation is mentioned by the character of Tzinacán, the priest of the pyramid of Qaholom, in Borges' story "The God's Script": "Consideré que aun en los lenguajes humanos no hay proposición que no implique el universo entero" (*OC* 1: 597).

Returning to "The Aleph", the digression of language from what is meant to be said can be demonstrated by the episode of Daneri's discovery of the Aleph:

> Es mío, es mío: yo lo descubrí en la niñez, antes de la edad escolar. La escalera del sótano es empinada, mis tíos me tenían prohibido el descenso, pero alguien dijo que había un mundo en el sótano. Se refería, lo supe después, a un baúl, pero yo entendí que había un mundo. Bajé secretamente, rodé por la escalera vedada, caí. Al abrir los ojos, vi el Aleph. (623)

As mentioned before, Daneri simply misunderstood the words and heard their literal meaning. 'The world' in the basement was actually a metaphor of a suitcase. Yet, Daneri thought that there was an actual world in the basement – and he was eventually right: there lay the glorious microcosm, the Aleph. Thus whereas Daneri's uncles used language in order to state a fact in the world, the presence of a suitcase in the basement, the language they used revealed the presence of the Aleph, the great mirror of the world. Language, thus, entails a digression: it shows much more than intended to be said.

In a more analytical approach, there are nine points of similarity between the vision of the Aleph and Wittgenstein showing doctrine:

Spatial paradox. According to Wittgenstein every proposition contains a logical spatial paradox: it points at one logical spot while manifesting the whole logical space (*Tractatus* 3.42). On the other hand, Borges' Aleph is a particular object within the world whose diameter is two or three centimeters, yet it enigmatically contains the whole cosmic space: "El diámetro del Aleph sería de dos o tres centímetros, pero el espacio cósmico estaba ahí, sin disminución de

tamaño" (625). Wittgenstein's paradox of logical space accords Borges' paradox of physical space.

Infinity. Logical space, concealed in every proposition, is, according to *Tractatus* 4.463, infinite. It is not clear in what sense does Wittgenstein use the word 'infinite' but it is likely that he means an unlimited possible combination of objects in the world (*Tractatus* 2.013). Such infinity is tacitly given by every proposition. Likewise, Borges characterizes the Aleph as infinite: "Por lo demás, el problema central es irresoluble: la enumeración, siquiera parcial, de un conjunto infinito" (625). Both the Aleph and logical space are infinite.

Reflecting the world. In the *Tractatus*, every proposition contains logical form (4.12) or the total logical space (3.42), the subsoil of all possible worlds. Therefore Wittgenstein declares in *Tractatus* 5.4711: "To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world". Similarly, the Aleph is a sphere in which the entire universe is reflected simultaneously: "(…) vi el Aleph, desde todos los puntos, vi en el Aleph la tierra (…)" (*OC* 1: 626).

The metaphor of the mirror. The central image of Wittgenstein's showing is 'mirroring': "propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them" (*Tractatus* 4.121). The image of the mirror stands for 'shows itself' (Black 189). Logic, accordingly, is characterized as "all-embracing logic, which mirrors the world" (*Tractatus* 5.511). Hence the image of the mirror serves as an interface between 'showing' and 'logical space'. On the other hand the mirror metaphor is dominant in the description of the Aleph (*OC* 1: 625). Borges describes the world and the Aleph as two mirrors reflecting each other reciprocally: " (...) vi en el Aleph la tierra, y en la tierra otra vez el Aleph y en el Aleph la tierra (…)" (626). Moreover, in the postscript the manuscript of Captain Burton deals with five different types of magical mirrors (627). Both the Aleph and showing, being a visual phenomenon, entail the image of the mirror.

Ineffability. Showing cannot be stated: "what *can* be shown, *cannot* be said" (*Tractatus* 4.1212). The main goal of the *Tractatus*, then, is to draw a line between a meaningful propositions and nonsense. Similarly, Borges stresses his inability to depict the Aleph via words: "

(...) empieza, aquí, mi desesperación de escritor (…) ¿cómo trasmitir a los otros el infinito Aleph, que mi temerosa memoria apenas abarca?" (624). On the other hand, Daneri's attempt to write a poem that depicts the entire spectacles of the Aleph is nonsense.

Mystical experience. In the *Tractatus* Logic underlies language (4.12). The basic 'experience' which underlies logic is, according to 5.552, "not that something or other is the state of things, but that something *is*", which is the mystical (6.44). Thus the mystical underlies logic, which underlies language. On the other hand Borges compares the vision of the Aleph to some mystical foresights (625). Indeed, the vision of Aleph maintains three constituent characteristics of a mystical experience as defined by William James: ineffability, noetic quality, and passivity; transiency, the fourth characteristic, is less obvious here (James 292-293).

Self-refutation. Concluding his book, Wittgenstein undermines his own text as nonsense: "My propositions serve as elucidation in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them" (*Tractatus* 6.54). Thus the *Tractatus* can be conceived as a self-refuting text (Friedlander 202-209). On the other hand, Borges starts his description of the Aleph with a negation: the crux of the story cannot be put in words (624). And he eventually adds that the whole vision of the Aleph might have been a false one: "Por increíble que parezca, yo creo que hay (o que hubo) otro Aleph, yo creo que el Aleph de la calle Garay era un falso Aleph" (627). These self-negations strive at maintaining the ineffability of their subjects.

The limits of language. The main goal of the *Tractatus* is to delineate the borders of what can be said meaningfully. Thus Wittgenstein remarks on philosophy: "It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said" (4.115). On the other hand, Borges admits that he cannot depict by words the infinitude of the Aleph. He thus accounts the foibles of language:

1) Language is a system of signs which postulates that the interlocutors share the same past (624);
2) Every literary account necessarily entails mendacity (625);
3) It is logically impossible to detail an infinite phenomenon (625);

4) Language is diachronic while the spectacles of the Aleph are synchronous (625).

The dual nature of language. Wittgenstein's showing doctrine presents a dichotomy within language between what can be said and what can only be shown (4.1212). Seen from the viewpoint of the *Tractatus'* showing doctrine, the central philosophical issue of "The Aleph" is a rupture within language. Language comprises two separate layers: the transcendental layer, represented by the Aleph, which shows and thus digresses its user's intentions, and the conventional layer of communication. The main point is that the latter cannot express the former; the Aleph, the resource of all speech, cannot be put in words. Language is thus a tension between a confined declaration and its digression.

Back to "The Aleph", the rift within language is expressed in the plot by the characters of Daneri and Borges. The distinction between Borges and Daneri represents the gap between a responsible writer who is aware of the limits of language, and of its mystery, and a remiss poet who strives at a total exposure of the secret of language (which corresponds to the secret of the universe). The task of Daneri, analogous to the enormous map of *On Exactitude in Science*, is to write a poem which will depict the world entirely: "El poema se titulaba *La Tierra;* tratábase de una descripción del planeta…" (619). As Daneri claims, the Aleph is the source and the precondition of his gigantic poem: "Vaciló y con esa voz llana (…) dijo que para terminar el poema le era indispensable la casa, pues en un ángulo del sótano había un Aleph" (622-623). Borges is an antithesis of Daneri (Massuh 100). Borges, a narrator, is careful in his attempt to depict the Aleph and thus he underlies the incompleteness of his task. This is the despair of a responsible narrator (624). While Daneri's poem is a literal ostentation, Borges strictly selects his words; and yet, ironically, Daneri possesses the Aleph whereas Borges desperately attempts to describe its spectacles via words. From the viewpoint of the *Tractatus*, then, Borges maintains the limits of what can be said and leaves space to the Aleph's showing while Daneri's global poem is nonsensical, a barren intellectual activity. Borges and Daneri represent, then, two antithetic approaches towards language.

We have seen that both the *Tractatus* and "The Aleph" manifest a dichotomy within language, a distinction between saying and showing or writing and the Aleph. Showing, the transcendental feature of language, digresses every saying. Finally, it should be asked whether this dichotomy can serve as a leading principle in Borges' perception of language. The answer to this question should be shown, so to speak, in a further investigation.

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